Who is responsible for our decline? – The Frankfurt School, of course.

Stuart Jeffries, Grand Hotel Abyss. The Lives of the Frankfurt School, Verso, London 2017

Poor Frankfurt School. Turn to the internet these days and you realize that the handful of German professors who go under that name are being held responsible for almost everything bad that has happened to society since … when? !990? 1970? 1945? Or even 1920? All these dates are being tossed around on those feverish websites. Neo-Marxism, cultural Marxism, feminism, multiculturalism, sexual excess, postmodernism, political correctness, and all in all the entire “Western decline” are due to their nefarious doings.

According to our new alt-right friends, the Frankfurt and cultural Marxist philosophy“now controls Western intellectualism, politics and culture. It was by design; it was created by an internationalist intelligentsia to eradicate Western values, social systems, and European racial groups in a pre-emptive attempt to spark global communist revolution.” (Click here) This discovery is, actually, a bit late. The Lyndon LaRouche folks have been saying much the same for the last quarter of a century. Walter Benjamin, the seemingly hapless Frankfurt intellectual – they have been saying – has in reality been the ultimate puppet master of modern civilization, responsible for everything from a bad turn in literary theory to bad TV. “Perhaps the most important, if least-known, of the Frankfurt School’s successes was the shaping of the electronic media of radio and television into the powerful instruments of social control which they represent today. This grew out of the work originally done by … Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.” (Click here) What else would you expect from those nefarious German-Jewish intellectuals?

Stuart Jeffries’ Grand Hotel Abyss is an indispensable antidote to such fevered excesses. It traces the lives of the members of the Frankfurt School from 1900 to the new millennium and of the school itself from its uncertain beginnings in Frankfurt in the 1920’s, through its exile in America, to its eventual return to Germany. Jeffries’ story reveals how marginalized the Frankfurt School people were right from the moment of the foundation of their institute, how they were forced to relocate the institute first to Geneva and then to New York to save it from Hitler’s powerful grip. In the US, the Frankfurt scholars found it difficult to get adjusted and while some of them stayed after the war, the two leading figures, Horkheimer and Adorno, returned to Frankfurt only to be caught up in the cultural and political turmoil of the late 1960’s. At no point did they succeed in establishing a hegemony over intellectual, cultural, and academic affairs or, for that matter, over the political debate. Benjamin committed suicide while trying to escape the Nazis; Adorno died of a heart attack after being confronted by rebellious left-wing students.

How far does the academic influence of the Frankfurt School in fact reach? Certainly not very far into Anglo-American philosophy departments which are still predominantly positivistic and analytic in outlook. If we are to look for foreign influences in those places we must turn to the logicians, linguistic philosophers, and philosophers of science of the Vienna Circle, not to the Frankfurt School. Certainly also not in political science departments which are mostly dedicated to “government studies” and have typically only a few “theorists” in their ranks. Certainly not in Sociology department. The sociologist Robert Dunn in a recent book complains bitterly about “the positivist tendencies and narrow scientific preoccupations … which have prevailed within the disciplinary mainstream at the expense of engagement with the social and human problems engendered by modern capitalist society.” (Toward a Pragmatist Sociology, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 2018, p. vii) And it’s not a turn to the Frankfurt School he calls for but to the all-American pragmatist John Dewey. We can go through the roster of humanities and social science departments across America and may find a smattering of Frankfurt School influence, but the mainstream remains firmly committed to positivistic, hermeneutic, historical, and traditional scholarly modes of thinking.

Jeffries tells his story in a lively fashion. I certainly kept on reading — though with reservations. The problem is that like any number of books these days Jeffries’ focuses on biography and human psychology and treats the accomplishments of the biographed figures only as incidental. Jeffries spends much of the first chapter to establish that the founders of the Frankfurt School were motivated by Oedipal feelings against their fathers. He calls Walter Benjamin the School’s greatest thinker but never really explains to us what makes him so great. The ideas that made the Frankfurt School famous are never elaborated. When it comes to basic Frankfurt School concepts like those of “dialectic” and “reification” Jeffries falls back on sketchy and wholly unsatisfactory characterizations. In the end, I was ready to reach for a classic like Martin Jay’s book The Dialectical Imagination to help me with understanding what made the Frankfurt School so interesting.

Forget Fire and Fury; It’s Confusion and Turmoil in Trump’s White House

Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury. Inside the Trump White House, Henry Holt and Company, New York 2018

On August 8 of last year, Donald Trump threatened North Korea with “fire and fury like the world has never seen.” His words were meant to cow the North Koreans into abandoning their nuclear and missile arsenal but until now, at least, they appear to have been only idle threats. Michael Wolff has now adopted the phrase as the title of his book on the first nine months of the Trump presidency – surely, a cleverly ironic choice. For since his election Trump has proved to be more a source of combative words than of real achievements.

Wolff insists that Trump and his circle had never expected to win the election, that he had been planning his campaign, instead, as a business promotion for the Trump brand and a possible new television channel. Victory thus left Trump unprepared for the job ahead. This story must, however, be too simple since Trump had been toying for years with the idea of running for president. He had been telling everyone willing to listen of all the things that, in his view, were wrong with America and the world, how they could be set right in simple ways were it not for corrupt and incompetent politicians everywhere, and how he, Trump, could easily do so, given half a chance. There was, no doubt, some hesitation in him about whether he would actually want to put such words into action. But in the end, it was a combination of overconfidence and ignorance that propelled Trump to actually seek the highest elected office.

He did so with few thoughts about job once he was elected. He had run his shaky business for many years as a small, somewhat chaotic family affair. How was he supposed to operate now the vast machinery of the Federal government? What was worse: “Trump didn’t read. He didn’t really even skim. If it was in print it might as well not exist. Some believed that for all practical purposes he was no more than semiliterate… But not only didn’t he read, he didn’t listen. He preferred to be the person talking. And he trusted his own expertise – no matter how paltry or irrelevant – more than anyone else’s.” (pp. 113-114) An explanation of the Constitution left him yawning. And when Joe Scarborough, the MSNBC host, asked him whom he called on for advice, Trump is supposed to have answered sheepishly: “Well, you won’t like the answer, but the answer is me. Me. I talk to myself.” (p. 47)

Resisting advice and skeptical of the Washington bureaucracy, Trump left himself, thus, open to being influenced by whatever he had seen most recently on television and whatever he had been told by the last person to speak to him. The problem was that even though Trump had strong opinions, he also changed them frequently and was often unable or unwilling to reach any final decision. Three factions vying for the new president’s attention emerged in consequence. There was Steve Bannon, backed up by Bob and Rebekah Mercer and the alt-right media, who pushed a confrontational agenda of “economic nationalism;” there was Reince Priebus and his cohort advancing a mainstream Republican Party line; and there was the family, Ivanka and Jared Kushner with their moderate “New York Democrat” friends. The competition between them soon turned bloody and led to the ouster of Priebus, Bannon, and others from the White House. The turmoil was exacerbated by the investigation of Russian interference in the election and possible collusion with this in the Trump campaign. This led soon to the ouster of the FBI director, James Comey, and Trump’s alienation from his Secretary of Justice, Jeff Sessions, one of his earliest supporters. The dynamic set thus into motion is still working itself out and we can expect more turmoil to come out of Trump’s White Hose.

While Donald Trump is the central figure in Wolff’s narrative, an important second role is filled by Steve Bannon. It was Bannon who, in fact, helped Wolff to gain initial access to Trump. Trump himself had then invited Wolff into the White House under the impression that Wolff was writing a book on his first year in office to be called The Great Transition. And so, Wolff, with Bannon’s help, managed to sit in the White House for half a year observing and overhearing the things he reports in his book. It begins and ends not surprisingly with Bannon. Its first section describes a dinner party in the spring of 2017 at which Bannon and Roger Ailes, the deposed head of Fox Television, freely dissect the Trump presidency and it ends after Bannon’s banishment from the White House with his declaration that “Trump was just the beginning.” For Bannon, Trump had, in fact, always been only the vehicle for his own political ambitions even as he was professing again and again his loyalty to the president. He could thus confidently declare after his ouster from the White House: “I am the leader of the nationalist, populist movement.” (p. 301) As far as Trump himself was concerned, Bannon foresaw that he would had little to fear from an investigation into his links to Russia. Yes, Donald Jr. had made a serious mistake when meeting with the Russians during the election campaign. But What he had done was possibly treasonous, or unpatriotic, and, in any case, “silly” and “bad shit.” (p. 255) And there was no reason to believe Donald Sr., when he denied all knowledge of this meeting. But none of this would be sufficient to bring the president down. It was, however, another matter altogether, if the inquiry should turn to Trump’s finances. “You realize where this is going,” Bannon said during another dinner party in July 2017: “This is all about money-laundering …. They are sitting on a beach trying to stop a Category Five.” (p. 278) Bannon had no doubt that Trump’s business dealings had been fishy. He thought, in the end that “there was a 33.3 percent chance that that the Mueller investigation would lead to the impeachment of the president, a 33.3 percent that Trump would resign, perhaps in the wake of a threat by the cabinet to act on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (by which the cabinet can remove the president in the event of incapacitation), and a 33.3 percent chance that he would limp to the end of his term. In any case, there would certainly not e second term, or even an attempt at one.” (p. 308)

Bannon emerges from this account as Wolff’s tragi-comic hero. Unlike Trump, he actually reads books (to the astonishment of everyone else in the Trump circle). Unlike Trump, he has ideas, convictions, and “projects.” Unlike Trump, he thinks in large, strategic terms about politics. But his learning is spotty and his vision of political reality and his own place in it is distorted. We can’t help feeling that he has been caught in the web of “fake news” that threatens to swamp everything and which the Breitbart channel directed by Bannon himself was so clever to exploit. It turns out that Bannon has come to believe in the absurd Noel Howe and William Strauss theory that history moves in strict generational circles and that we are now in the fourth stage of that development, a moment when the existing order inevitably disintegrates. So, Bannon’s view of American and world politics is duly apocalyptic. And he is eager to speed the apocalypse on its way; Trump is for him only one of the tools to bring that about. If this world-view separates him from Trump, he shares with the president an overwhelming desire to speak, to communicate and what the one pursues with his tweets, the other does through incessant leaks. It is this inability to stay silent that finally brought Bannon down. Bannon’s leaks were, no doubt, a rich source for Wolff’s book they were finally also instrumental also bringing about the complete break with Trump.

Wolff’s book has been criticized for a number of factual errors – though none of them deadly – and for his willingness to conjecture and interpret, but when we read it in the light of what we already know about Trump’s presidency from other sources, we cannot doubt its overall veracity. Its devastating effect is not even primarily due to its revelations (there are a few) but to the fact that it collects bits of common knowledge into a single compelling narrative. The book is a major achievement of the kind that the great Roman historians would have recognized. It is not like works of modern historical scholarship with their endless footnotes referencing every claim, and their desire for detachment and balance. Like the Roman historians, Wolff seeks to tell a story and he allows himself to put fitting words into people’s mouths. Like the ancient historians, he revels in the foibles and vices of our rulers. And also in the style of those historians he is clearly advancing an agenda, all the while claiming to be writing in a disinterested fashion (“sine ira et studio,” as the Romans put it).

After reading Wolff’s book it becomes difficult to believe that the Trump presidency will have a happy outcome either for Trump himself or the United States as a whole. If that turns out to be the case, Wolff’s book will surely be read for a long time. Even if it comes otherwise, I hope that the book will be remembered for its vivid depiction of a deeply disquieting moment in US history.

 

Why I am (still) a philosopher

 (Click here for part 1)

Dear Raymond,

Do we have to be as pessimistic about the future of philosophy as you are in your latest book? I still hold some hope for the subject and believe it, in fact, to be needed today more than ever.

That said, I agree with you that the current state of philosophy is not good. You are right that philosophy as conducted in our Universities and Colleges seems to be turning more and more into a propaedeutic enterprise for future lawyers. But what we call “philosophy” has often been two very different things: on the one hand, a scholastic undertaking for schooling young minds, and, on the other, a creative form of thinking on “fundamental” issues and the latter has frequently taken place outside the educational institutions. Of the philosophical thinkers you discuss in your book only some were professors. Socrates was a public gadfly and nuisance, Lucretius a poet, Augustine a bishop, Montaigne a bit of a hermit, and Hobbes a courtier. It may turn out that the most serious thinkers of the future will not be found in philosophy departments.

Philosophy as serious thinking has, of course, never been an academic “discipline” with set boundaries and doctrines. It has always moved, as you describe in your book, from subject to subject, and for question to question, like a snake wriggling here and there, constantly shedding its old skin. Since science has changed our intellectual climate and technology our social environment, we shouldn’t expect philosophy to remain the same. I like a phrase that Wittgenstein used to describe his own work; he called it “one of the heirs of the subject that used to be called ‘philosophy’.” So, whatever it was that once went under the label of philosophy has left an inheritance; something is left over to be carried into the future; but the inheritance is dispersed; there is more than one heir. That seems to capture where we find ourselves today.

I like to believe that there will be those in the future who will continue to ask questions about all kinds of things that others are leaving unquestioned. There will be those who continue to invent new concepts and with their help recast what may already have been said by others; there will be those who experiment with new ways of looking at ourselves and the world; there will be those who attend to all kinds of details of things that others pass by; and there will also be those who test arguments for and against all kinds of sane or insane convictions. All that will hopefully go on and we may as well call what is practiced in some such a way by the old name of “philosophy.” There is surely no harm in appropriating that word for ourselves. In doing so we are waving our hand at those who have come before us, indicating to them that we are still walking on the road on which they have walked.

But if we say that philosophy as serious creative thinking is still needed, we must be clear on where and how it is. We must ask ourselves: what calls most urgently for such thinking? We have been through a period where philosophers would have said that we need to think most urgently about the foundations of knowledge, logic, mathematics, or science. I believe that our priorities must be different and here I think you and I will agree. What most calls for thinking today is our social and political existence because we can see today how fragile their structure has become. And if we can’t secure our social and political existence, then nothing else can be secured. This alerts us to the fact that our entire reality is changing dramatically and that we will therefore also need a new kind to creative thinking, one that can keep up with the changes around us. Our question then becomes, who will be able to engage in the kind of thinking that is now needed. This is where the challenge of your book really begins to bite. Of how much creativity is our philosophizing capable? There may, of course, be no theoretical answer to this. All we can do is commit ourselves to the project of serious thinking and continue to work as well as we can with what we have inherited.

Your friend,

Hans

Does philosophy have a future?

Raymond Geuss,  Changing the Subject. Philosophy from Socrates to Adorno, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 2017

Professor Raymond Geuss
Professor Raymond Geuss

Raymond Geuss has made a name for himself in recent years as a critic of the abstract, normative theorizing that dominates mainstream political philosophy today and is represented most prominently by the work of John Rawls. (The kind of philosophizing that asks: What is the ideal socio-political order? What is the best form of government? What are the right principles of justice? and that proposes carefully honed theoretical answers to these set questions.)  By contrast, politics, is for Geuss, a practical craft rather than the application of a theory; it is concerned with what people do rather than what they ought to do; and its actions take place in institutional contexts that change over time. Political thought should therefore be  realist, practical and historical in spirit and forego the search for general normative principles; these, Geuss argues, will in any case turn out to be formulaic and politically useless. (Philosophy and Real Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008)

It is, perhaps, no accident then that Geuss has been led now to take a broader critical look at the entire tradition of philosophy. Changing the Subject consists of twelve essays on individual philosophers from Socrates to Adorno, focusing in almost every case on a single text. Geuss calls it “an intellectually relaxed essayistic introduction to some issues that I take to be of interest.” (p. xvi) Socrates, Plato, Lucretius, Augustine, Montaigne, Hobbes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Lukács, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Adorno are each given an essayistic reading, but some other prominent philosophers – Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, and Kant – are all absent. But historical completeness is not Gauss’ goal. That was, he explains at the end of his book, to show us how “the questions which humans ask change, depending on the historical and social circumstances.” Most of the questions which philosophers have asked were moreover never convincingly answered and some have simply disappeared. In a final, positive flourish Geuss declares: “There are, however, questions that do not go away, even if we cannot adequately answer them.” (p. 302) It is obviously his hope to have shown in the course of his twelve essay which questions these are and why it is worth asking them in ever new ways, even when we can’t come up with conclusive answers.

But there is another worry that becomes apparent in Geuss’ conclusion to his book. He understands that “the twelve authors whose work was discussed here do not form a natural group or an invisible collegium or tribunal.” (p. 302) Why then do we call them all philosophers? What is this discipline whose questions seem to be changing over time and whose answers are never final? Geuss is convinced that there has been enough continuity “that one can pick out an identifiable configuration called ‘philosophy’.” (p. 296) But the configuration has a specifically historical character: it began with Socrates and Plato, and we should not assume that it will persist indefinitely. Geuss has, indeed, doubts that it can go on because “it is a highly peculiar social and cultural configuration which requires a highly specific set of conditions to flourish. These conditions, whatever they are, do not seem to have existed during the past forty years.” (p. 301) The conclusion suggests itself to him because he does not see any kind of originality left in philosophy, no real capacity for turning old questions into new ones. Philosophy, he fears, has lost its capacity to “change the subject.” And it is certainly remarkable how “professional” and inbred philosophy has become today, how preoccupied it has become with elaborating ever more complex theories. There have really been no philosophical writings in the last half century or so who have succeeded in opening up new issues.  Such publications – from, let us, Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish – are by now all half a century old.

Geuss allows that, even without being creative, the discipline may continue for a while “as an exercise in running through traditional thoughts and forms of argument in pedagogical or propaedeutic contexts.” (p. 300) It may persist through mere inertia. “This is the current state of philosophy in the universities.” (p. 301) Its logical and linguistic puzzles may go on to occupy some minds as a harmless occupation and private pastime. But genuine philosophy can flourish only under very specific conditions. For it to exist “deeply rooted dissatisfaction with the state of our world must be experienced by some people who are living a life in which their basic physical needs are satisfied, are capable of focusing developed intellectual and cognitive powers on their situation, and do not think the situation is so self-evidently hopeless that there is no point in thinking about it.” (p. 299) Admittedly: “Just because nothing much seems to have happened since the 1970s doesn’t mean that the dying embers of the subject might not flare up into life again under the right circumstances.” (p. 298) But Geuss concludes despondently that “we cannot assume that as our world falls apart now in ecological catastrophe, there will necessarily be any renewal of philosophical activity.” (p. 299)

Should we agree with this dire assessment? We might answer Geuss that philosophy has previously gone through cycles of creativity and sterility, and that it has been in an unusually productive phase since the last quarter of the 19th century, one which seems now to have run its course. Phenomenology and existential philosophy, positivism and analytic philosophy all originated in this period. So one response to Geuss would be to counsel patience and see whether some new forms of philosophical thinking will eventually emerge. But what about his worry that in the face of a looming ecological catastrophe this is unlikely o happen. There are, of course, those who discern no such catastrophe ahead. But even if one agrees with Geuss on such a possibility, one might think that it is precisely what calls for philosophical engagement. Aren’t we faced with the question what it can mean for us to be human under the present conditions and why the human form of existence deserves to be preserved and nurtured? Are we justified in giving up on this question simply because the looming catastrophe may overwhelm us? Perhaps we should be saying in the words of T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets: “There is only the fight to recover what has been lost and found and lost again and again: and now under conditions that seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss. For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.”