China and Iran are among the most inhospitable places in the world for free expression. The two countries jail the most writers, 90 and 57 respectively, but also occupy the top two positions in PEN America’s Writers at Risk Database. Iran showed the largest increase, following ongoing nationwide protests in 2022, with 39 new cases of detention or imprisonment. Iran is also the largest jailer of women writers globally, with 16 of 42 women in custody being in Iran. China is not far behind, with 11 women writers behind bars.
Category: Uncategorized
MISSING LINKS. Censorship in China 2
Censorship of the digital media is a global problem. China is particularly active in controlling and restricting its citizens’ access to the media. This detailed report from Toronto University’s Citizen Lab examines how Chinese censorship works. The lessons to be drawn from the study have clearly much wider implications.
Missing Links: A comparison of search censorship in China – The Citizen Lab
CENSORSHIP IN CHINA 1
How a triple whammy of censorship, Covid and Big Tech cuts left China’s media on its knees
- At the peak of the country’s tech boom, the biggest tech firms began to aggressively build up media portfolios but they are now beating a hasty retreat
- It is the latest blow to a sector struggling from the impact of the pandemic and an ever more restrictive atmosphere
Ji Siqi and Yuanyue Dang in Beijing
South China Morning Post
Published: 6:00am, 24 Apr, 2023
On the first Friday of this month, around 80 video reporters and editors attended a meeting on the sixth floor of The Beijing News building near the heart of the Chinese capital.
They had been summoned to witness the end of a six-year joint venture between what was formerly one of China’s most outspoken daily newspapers and the technology giant Tencent.
The official explanation given for the break-up was business restructuring, with daily management of the Wevideo team being returned to the state-owned paper. The team’s bold coverage had already been reined in as the authorities further consolidated their grip on the domestic media.
But, according to several people close to the matter, the direct cause was the withdrawal of investment from Tencent, which meant a quarter of the team’s workforce had to leave. The Beijing News and Tencent have yet to respond to requests for comment.
For the industry, many of the problems have already been there for 10 years, and they have kept worsening, especially in the past three yearsBeijing-based news editor
Wevideo’s fate tolled yet another bell for China’s media industry, which has been sinking rapidly in the past few years amid intensified censorship and an exodus of capital.
Many industries – especially in the private sector – have been weakened by regulatory crackdowns and the effects of a strict zero-Covid strategy that lasted for almost three years, but while some anticipate better times, for many Chinese media workers any talk of recovery is just wishful thinking.
“For the industry, many of the problems have already been there for 10 years, and they have kept worsening, especially in the past three years,” said a Beijing-based news editor who has been in the industry for 20 years. “Now it’s already the epilogue.”
While the pandemic added to the woes of the media industry around the world – from content creators to distributors – as advertising revenue dwindled further, stifling censorship has further accelerated the death of the market-oriented segment of the industry in China, where most news outlets are completely reliant on state funding and serve as propaganda tools.
It was also compounded by a slew of cost-cutting actions by China’s biggest technology firms in the face of economic headwinds, including exiting noncore businesses.
“The censorship has greatly exacerbated the dilemma,” the Beijing-based news editor said. “Capital has more and more concerns when entering the industry.
“If no capital is willing to enter any more, the industry will only wane.”
Eleven days after the Wevideo restructuring, the biggest fire in Beijing in decades broke out at a hospital, killing at least 29 people.
But in the following eight hours, not a single Chinese media outlet reported on the incident, and the army of online censors stamped out any mention on social media platforms.
Patients and doctors climb out windows to flee deadly fire at Beijing hospital
One former journalist, using the pseudonym Lilian Yang, said it was another level of censorship compared to her experience when covering another deadly fire that broke out in a building converted into tiny flats on the outskirts of Beijing in 2017.
Back then, videos about the fire started to trend on social media within minutes, and she and a few colleagues at the newspaper were sent to the scene immediately. Though she was asked to return to the office halfway through the day as the local authorities began to apply pressure, her colleagues managed to get a story published.
Similar pressure surfaced more frequently in the following two years, with more “red lines” about what could be reported gradually emerging. But the sharpest tightening began months after the Covid-19 pandemic began in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province.
“More and more topics were not allowed to be covered, and because we had fewer stories to do, our remuneration declined sharply,” she said.
She decided to join an exodus of reporters from the newspaper and, after a few attempts, found work at an online media outlet specialising in feature stories.
Unlike Chinese newspapers or magazines, all of which must be overseen by a government agency, online media outlets that distribute their content on social media platforms and news aggregation apps do not receive direct orders from the authorities, but the lack of state backing also means they face the risk of suspension or permanent closure if any content crosses the line set by the authorities.
About a year after she joined the new company, its accounts were banned by a range of platforms – with no reason given – and the team was later disbanded.
Such bans were “destructive” for content distributors, the Beijing-based news editor said, as their old names, or any new names including key elements from the old brands, were not allowed to be used if they tried to recreate their accounts.
That means more than 90 per cent of their old readers would be lostBeijing-based news editor
“That means more than 90 per cent of their old readers would be lost,” he said.
Meanwhile, the reasons behind suspensions or shutdowns were usually vague, and that led to more self-censorship.
“That means there is always a sword of Damocles hanging over your head, and sometimes self-censorship is stricter than external censorship,” he said.
“Because you don’t want to touch the ceiling of censorship, you always want to be a little farther away from the ceiling. But the point is, where is the ceiling? No one knows. So the self-censorship will only be stricter and stricter.”
In August, an influential health platform with tens of millions of followers called Dingxiang Yuan – also known as DXY – was suspended from publishing articles on all Chinese social media platforms for a month.
Regular employees at the science-based platform – also backed by Tencent – were not told the reasons for its suspension, said former staff writer Oscar Zhang – another pseudonym.
Previously, it had closely followed up pandemic lockdowns, debunked Covid-19 misinformation and criticised the government’s promotion of a traditional medicine called Lianhua Qingwen to treat the respiratory disease.
A month after the ban was lifted, Zhang was laid off and the features team he worked for dissolved, substantiating a rumour he had heard before the ban.
“Because DXY is also a tech company, it had to cut costs against the background of economic headwinds,” he said. “It was very difficult to bring the company direct benefits through pure content creation, thus teams like ours would bear the brunt.”
At the peak of the Chinese tech boom around 2016, tech giants such as Tencent and Alibaba began to aggressively build up media portfolios in the news and entertainment sectors. They are now beating a hasty retreat.
Ant Group, an affiliate of Alibaba, began to withdraw investments from various influential Chinese media outlets, including the financial magazine Caixin and tech news site 36Kr, in late 2021.
Apart from cost-cutting, a key driver behind the moves was a document issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning agency, in October 2021 that reiterated a ban on private enterprise investment in news organisations – a ban that had been enforced relatively laxly.
Tencent has also been downsizing its media-related workforce as it has pulled resources out of noncore business.
A staff writer for a Tencent News original content curation team focusing on in-depth analysis of the entertainment industry said she was laid off in the summer of 2022 along with all her teammates. On the same afternoon, a few other similar content creation teams working on different projects were also wiped out.
Everyone was very nervous, and all departments felt that they were going to be gone soonTencent News staff writer
There had been some signs of hardship months before, she said, as more project ideas were rejected because they were “unprofitable”.
“But in the past, the company would not think about it this way, as long as the content had social value the idea would be passed.” she said.
Then, at the beginning of the year, a few colleagues on her team were forced to leave due to unsatisfactory performance, and in the following months, as she anxiously watched the company gradually cut employee benefits – from masks to paper towels – she knew what was awaiting her.
“Everyone was very nervous, and all departments felt that they were going to be gone soon,” she said.
The Promise and Problems of Political Realism
Across the globe, politics today is beset by illusions, conspiracy theories, apocalyptic visions, wishful thinking, false certainties, ungrounded ideologies – deceptive beliefs of all kinds. These delusions lead to terrible political choices and equally terrible outcomes.
It is urgent to return to the realities of politics, if we are to make sense of where we are and take care of what must be done to assure human survival and flourishing. Political realism is what the hour demands from us.
THE PROMISE AND PROBLEMS OF POLITUCAL REALISM
A conference at Berkeley, May 4-5
US REPUBLICANS DECLARE THEMSELVES A CRAZED CULT
After the indictment of Donald Trump for paying hush money to a porn star so as not to damage his reputation with his evangelical base before the 2016 election, the Young Republicans put out a statement that illustrates perfectly the moral bankruptcy of current Republicanism. Trump, it proclaimed, “can be said to be our psyche from id to super-ego—as does no other figure; his soul is totally bonded with our core values and emotions.” Yes, indeed, their values are totally bonded with Trump’s. Who could say it better?
This is, unfortunately, no laughing matter given their threat to wage “total war.” We may want to call it the “hush money war” – a truly noble cause. But a threatened war, nonetheless.
Statement on President Trump’s Indictment
March 30, 2023
Today, our nation careens toward tyranny at an unprecedented pace. An impudent cabal of radical figures abandons all propriety in their dogged attacks on President Donald J. Trump. We have taken a decisive step away from the values that define our national character.
Every utterance that has escaped these monsters’ lips since President Trump first came down the escalator has built toward this moment; each falsehood, each misdirection, each deliberate misportrayal found its culmination in Alvin Bragg’s desperate action today.
Radical leftist interests, beholden to an elite, internationalist cabal have taken the unprecedented step of indicting President Donald J. Trump, the leading candidate for the 2024 presidential election.
Every American feels today the solid grasp of the Fifth Column on his throat; henceforth, we must openly acknowledge what so many have long known: that control of our nation’s fate has long been prised from our grasp. Let anyone who celebrates this downfall of our republic be forever branded a traitor to our nation. No one who mocks the people’s will can claim the title of an American.
President Trump embodies the American people—our psyche from id to super-ego—as does no other figure; his soul is totally bonded with our core values and emotions, and he is our total and indisputable champion. This tremendous connection threatens the established order.
The fix has always been “in” against our President, but his motivation and love for the American people drove him to pursue the national excellence that his unique vision perceived lay within our reach. In doing so, he opened so many eyes to reality.
Last summer, in Tampa Florida, addressing a crowd of thousands of youths, President Trump stated that if he backed down from challenging the regime, he would have been left alone. That the regime now sheds the mask of “democracy” and unveils its true and hideous face shows how committed President Trump is to standing with the people. Every American owes him thanks.
Despite our tremendous success holding marquee protests in Manhattan for critical rightwing causes, today we remain at home. Let our silence be a condemnation of the captivity of our nation; a polemic on the state of our republic. We will not allow another Fedsurrection; we will not be pawns in the Deep State’s perpetual effort to delegitimize Americans’ fundamental right of assembly.
President Trump assured us that he was our retribution. Now we must return the rejoinder: our victory will be the joint vindication that our great President Donald J. Trump and our American people both deserve. This is Total War.
CHINA, RUSSIA, AND IRAN: A Legion of Doom?
The US appears increasingly faced with an unwanted coalition of opponent states. The question is how to deal with that situation. Daniel Drezner of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has just published some helpful thoughts on the matter.
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/03/19/us-china-russia-relations-00087633
Drezner is surely right in arguing that the US should seek to prevent the emerging coalition of China, Russia, and Iran (plus, potentially North Korea) from hardening into a solid political, economic, and military alliance of hostile forces. He concludes that “given the unsteady state of the world, repairing the Sino-American relationship is the option that offers the most promise.” This is, undoubtedly, a reasonable proposal. but is it a realistic one? Drezner understands that it is an option that both President Joe Biden and his Republican opponents are unlikely to embrace in the current unstable state of American politics.
But it is not only the condition of American politics that makes a rapprochement with China difficult to achieve. For it is far from clear that China’s president Xi Jinping would allow his coalition-building with Russia and Iran to be interrupted. For economic reasons, it would certainly be in the interest of China to keep its relations with the US and its allies on course. But are economic considerations first and foremost in Xi’s mind? Xi’s words may suggest that they are, but the evidence of his actions speaks differently. They reveal, instead, a great deal of belligerence on Xi’s part driven by his ideological commitments rather than utilitarian calculations.
A new collection of Wittgenstein essays
This new collection contains my piece on “Facts, Possibilities, and the World: Three Lessons from the Tractatus”
A BRAVE STAND FOR FREE SPEECH
Chung Pui-Kuen, the former editor of the now defunct Hong Kong STAND NEWS, is currently on trial for publishing a number of “seditious” articles. Stand News trial: Ex-Hong Kong editor accused of sedition says politicians should be free to criticise authorities – Hong Kong Free Press HKFP (hongkongfp.com)
In defense of his editorial decisions Chung has told the court that “the space for free speech should permit the most fierce criticism and accusations, especially when the target is the authorities,” because government corruption might otherwise be the result. And he warned that “the government’s suppression of critical voices or opinions will cause hatred more easily” than any articles published in Stand News. Chung defended, in particular, the publication of two interviews with two politicians from the democratic opposition.
It was important that their voices were heard and preserved for the historical record, he argued, “Some would say journalism is to provide the first draft of history. While it can be flawed, incomplete, or with potential mistakes… at least it provides a basis for future discussions.”
Chung’s words are particularly remarkable because they were spoken at the same time as Hong Kong’s big show trial against 47 of its former democratic leaders is under way. His words sounded like a ringing defense of their right to speak and to hold the opinions they did. Their trial is certainly extraordinary. The 47 are accused of behavior that in other places would be considered part of the normal business of politics: organizing to win an election, trying to select the most promising candidates, proposing to stop the government’s budget, if they won a majority, and possibly even forcing the government to resign. But the authority’s understanding seems to have been that they were allowed to run only as long as they would not win and would be unable to enact their proposed policies.
LIMITS OF INTELLIGIBILITY
With my own contribution “Wittgenstein on the Limits of Language” – part of my grappling with the Tractatus.
For China’s intellectuals, restrictions started long before the pandemic and will continue after Covid is over
SOUTH CHINA MORNING NEWS
Guo Rui Jun Mai in Beijingand William Zheng in Hong Kong
Published: 10:30pm, 2 Jan, 2023
For Sheng Hong, a prominent economist based in Beijing, in-person academic events and overseas trips were restricted long before the Covid-19 pandemic, and they are likely to outlive the pandemic too.
As Sheng tried to host a biweekly panel discussion in the summer of 2018, the small group of scholars were expelled and forced to move twice during the half-day meeting.
They ultimately wrapped up their discussion of complexity economics, a cutting-edge branch of economics, on the pavement.
Later that year, on his way to a conference at Harvard University, Sheng was stopped at an airport in Beijing by the authorities who warned that his travel posed a threat to state security.
He was director of the Unirule Institute of Economics think tank which promoted liberalisation of the country’s economy and that was shut down by the government in 2020.
“It started before the pandemic,” said Sheng, referring to Beijing’s rules in the name of preventing Covid-19 that restricted in-person events and international travel.
“The direct reason is simply restrictions set by the authorities.”
Sheng is among a number of Chinese intellectuals who have found it increasingly difficult to publicly express their academic views or exchange them with fellow scholars, especially when those views are at odds with those held and promoted by the Communist Party under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.
Since Xi assumed power in 2012, he has conducted a far-reaching project to reshape the country’s intellectual and ideological outlook. During the 20th party congress in October he declared that in the past 10 years China’s ideology landscape had seen an “all round and fundamental” improvement.
The project, as Xi summarised in a series of speeches over the decade, involves chipping away all platforms or spaces where views are unflattering to Beijing, as well as flooding the public discourse with narratives and values favoured by the party.
According to scholars who spoke to the South China Morning Post, at universities the evaluation of professors in the social sciences has become more focused on their contribution to the party’s ideology, and people who dare to deviate from it must constantly look over their shoulder for student informants and surprise inspectors sent from high authorities.
The scholars expressed concern that these settings would seriously impair the ability of the country’s intellectuals to expand their knowledge in social sciences, as well as the next generation’s ability to think critically, a trend some said had already become obvious.
A literature teacher at a Guangzhou-based university surnamed Liu – who did not wish to give her full name due to the sensitivity of the subject – said at each faculty meeting she was reminded she was not supposed to talk to students about seven subjects. They include universal values, press freedom and civil rights.
Those seven topics were designated taboo in college courses in 2013, the year Xi became president, and have since been established as a firm red line in ideology in Chinese universities.
“The [school’s] secretary emphasised that at almost every meeting,” Liu said. “So in classes, we need to conduct some self-censorship and think of a way to say certain things so it’s acceptable to all, including the student informants.”
In her classes, Liu must navigate talking about women writers without getting too much into feminism, and determine how to teach the Divine Comedy with as few details about Christianity as possible.
Any scholar without a clear state affiliation seeking to publish findings on Hong Kong, Taiwan and Muslim groups in China could expect to be rebuked by Chinese journals, she said. She added that invitations to any guest speaker in class must be preapproved.
A direct result of these restrictions on social sciences is that the country has stopped acquiring new knowledge on those topics, according to a Beijing-based political scientist who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“All these censored areas have stopped developing,” the person said. “Look no further than the Cultural Revolution. The studies abroad are much better than those inside the country. There is almost no one studying it now.”
In addition to the various restrictions on topics available to be studied, Chinese scholars are assessed under a system based on political indoctrination, with various Marxist schools and university courses at its centre, according to a professor surnamed Li who teaches media studies at a university in Guangdong.
“Regardless what subject is being taught, one needs to establish some links between it and Xi’s thoughts,” said Li, referring to the president’s political theory that has been enshrined in the state constitution since 2018.
“Once you spend all your daily energy on these things, you become a different person. You’ll be unable to conduct international academic discussions, address trending social topics, or anything a real scholar is supposed to do,” Li said.
By March, there were more than 1,400 Marxist schools inside China’s universities, according to the Ministry of Education. There has been a rapid proliferation in recent years of these institutes, which were set up not only in comprehensive universities but also medical schools and art academies around the country.
They are heavily focused on courses as well as studying the achievements of the party’s governance, especially under Xi.
In various speeches in the past 10 years, Xi has repeatedly called for the work on thought politics – or political indoctrination – to permeate “the entire process” of education in colleges and universities.
He has also said the ultimate purpose of education should be to train for the future of China’s political system.
“We need to be clear about the goal of educating people, and it’s very clear that the goal is to nurture builders and successors of socialism,” he said in a 2019 speech. “If we spend much time nurturing people who are grave diggers of our system, what is the point of education?”
But in the fresh faces joining her university, communications professor Li noticed an obvious pattern of students’ weakening ability to analyse.
“The consequence is they are getting worse at critical thinking,” she said. “The homework I’ve received after the pandemic is very different from that received before it. And there’s blatant hostility towards foreign matters.”
The intellectual landscape in China’s social sciences has even troubled some of the firmest supporters of the Communist Party and staunchest defenders of its policies.
“The US and the West kicked off decoupling with China in high technology and that made people here realise technology is the fundamental power of innovation. And my understanding is that ‘original ideas’ in social science matter just as much,” said Zheng Yongnian, director of the Institute for International Affairs at Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen.
Zheng said a thinker was “not something that could be brought up, but something that grows in a tolerant environment”.
Official interference with academic work must be minimised so scholars could have room to research and express themselves freely, he said.
Zheng is a seasoned political scientist well respected by the Communist Party. He was among a handful of scholars invited for a 2020 lecture for the Politburo – the country’s highest policymaking body, led by Xi – on China’s five-year plan.
But Zheng said that given China’s academic environment – made worse by a rigid evaluation system heavily focused on the publishing of papers – it would be a “fairy tale” to see important thinkers on social sciences emerge.
“The evaluation system [for scholars] here is simply suffocating people’s minds,” he said. “China is now big on the number of papers being published, but small on original ideas.”
Sheng Hong used to sit on a panel of 50 economists that advised the Chinese government. The panel was co-founded in 1998 by Liu He, the outgoing vice-premier.
Sheng is among a handful of prominent economists who lost their seat on the body during a reshuffle in 2019. During that reorganisation, a few officials in regulatory agencies gained seats.
The Beijing-based economist does not know how his activities are still being restricted in 2023.
“The only way to figure out if I’m still on the exit ban list is to try to fly out,” he said. “It’s so tiring after preparing all the materials for academic conferences and being stopped at the airport.
“Academic development is doomed to be stalled, and so is cultural diversity and the general public’s knowledge. The public is no longer in somewhat neutral information surroundings.”
Is there a common good?
Both conservative and leftwingers have maintained that there is a common good which we should set out to realize. But other conservatives and leftwingers have declared with equal conviction that there is any such common good. Could it be that both sides are unclear about what is at stake?
The case against the assumption of a common good is usually made in the name of moral pluralism or individualism. The claim is that there exists a plurality of different conceptions of the good which can lay equal claim to validity. In one version of this claim, this moral pluralism manifests itself in the existence of different cultures; another, more radical version assumes that moral pluralism is grounded in human individuality.
Stuart Hampshire argues vividly argument against the idea of a common good t in his 1989 book Innocence and Experience. He asserts that the only thing that can hold society together is a commitment to procedures for negotiating our moral differences. The key to the social order is what he calls “procedural justice” — which he contrasts to a substantive conception of justice which, according to him, is always the expression of a particular understanding of the good. Procedural justice, he writes, is a means for enabling human beings “to co-exist in civil society, to survive without any substantial reconciliation between them, and without a search for a common ground. [My emphasis] It is neither possible nor desirable that the mutually hostile conceptions of the good should be melted down to form a single and agreed conception of the human good. A machinery of arbitration is needed and this machinery has to be established by negotiation. Justice can then clear the path to recognition of untidy and temporary compromises between incompatible visions of a better way life.” (p. 109)
This account suffers from a number of flaws. The first is that it treats conceptions of the good as if they were necessarily disjoint. But we know from history and experiences that such conceptions may overlap in part and that the communalities they share may serve as a basis for mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence in society. We also know that parties that meet will try not only to identify existing common ground but set out to create new such ground. Societies are never held together only by a shared sense of procedural justice. they also seek to foster common sentiments.
We must accept that there is no complete vision of a common good shared by humanity at large and that there cannot be such a thing. But that should not deter us from striving to achieve a limited sort of social consensus. This is, indeed, what we generally set out to do in politics. We can, for that reason, characterize politics as an ongoing search for a common good. But we must allow at the same time that there is no single ultimate good of this kind to be found. Our search does not have a single, fixed target. We must also acknowledge that even when we agree, for the time being, on a particular conception of the good, there are likely to be those excluded by that conception. Social consensus is never the consensus of everyone in society.